Some Philosophy

Ceteris paribus, the more powerful (able to model/manipulate more of reality) an individual lump of conscious reality is, the easier it will have its way. Therefore the precept of ‘might is right’, or ‘will to power’, are less about moral proposition than a position of material fact. What is morality, but the idea that some individuals will have their values achieved? As whose property are the most value achievements to come, if not the property of the most powerful, as they are the ones best able to rule greater slices of reality?

Thus follows a kind of ‘deterministic morality’. Whatever happens will, ceteris paribus (the statistical imprecision being due to individual lumps of matters’ less than perfect ability to model reality and subsequently achieve their goals), be for the best in terms of sheer preferences, if we accept the idea that on average the more intelligent a lump of matter, the better it will model reality, the more it will achieve its values; but also the more intelligent it be, the more capable of consciousness, the more worthy of moral consideration, the more its preferences should weigh in a utility calculation; leading to the probability that those that want, get, and those who get, deserve.

If we posit consciousness as the reason for the consideration of moral utility, to maximise utility we should merely wish to maximise consciousness and thus too minimise restrictions to the creation of consciousness. Consciousness is the quasi-transcendental mix of utilisation of empiricism via sensations, and rational computation in the form of cognition. We would expect then that to achieve maximal morality, we merely want a more complicated world filled with strange loops. And if we’re intelligent enough to warrant the title of deserving it, chances are we’ll achieve it.

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